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| 0618-2899-01 | Wittgenstein: Following A Rule | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| FACULTY OF HUMANITIES | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Course description
In the “Following a rule” sections of his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein presents one of the most important and influential arguments in philosophy of the second half of the 20th century. The argument is often understood as the heart of Wittgenstein’s post-Tractarian conception of language.
Commentators differ in their understanding of the meaning of the argument, of its implications on Wittgenstein conception of philosophy and of its relations with the “Private Language” argument that follows. All seem to agree though on its central role in Wittgenstein’s response to the theory of meaning he developed in the Tractatus and on the fact that it touches upon critical questions in Philosophy of Language, among them:
• What determines the meaning of rule-expressions, or the meaning of expressions using universal concepts?
• Can a theory of meaning be based on the conception of language as a set of rules?
• How is the learning context of an expression related to its justification context?
• What is the role of interpretation, understanding and application in determining the meaning of an expression?
• How can the relation between an expression’s extension and its intension to be construed?
The course will focus on the “Following a rule” sections of the Philosophical Investigations, through reading in Wittgenstein’s writings, as well as in selected writings by commentators, among them Hacker, Kripke, Cavell, McDowell, and Diamond.
Commentators differ in their understanding of the meaning of the argument, of its implications on Wittgenstein conception of philosophy and of its relations with the “Private Language” argument that follows. All seem to agree though on its central role in Wittgenstein’s response to the theory of meaning he developed in the Tractatus and on the fact that it touches upon critical questions in Philosophy of Language, among them:
• What determines the meaning of rule-expressions, or the meaning of expressions using universal concepts?
• Can a theory of meaning be based on the conception of language as a set of rules?
• How is the learning context of an expression related to its justification context?
• What is the role of interpretation, understanding and application in determining the meaning of an expression?
• How can the relation between an expression’s extension and its intension to be construed?
The course will focus on the “Following a rule” sections of the Philosophical Investigations, through reading in Wittgenstein’s writings, as well as in selected writings by commentators, among them Hacker, Kripke, Cavell, McDowell, and Diamond.