Kant's critical philosophy is divided to three parts: The Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of Power of Judgment. The first part examines the boundaries of reason; the second examines the a priori grounds of moral judgments and the possibility of morality, while the third examines the nature and content of aesthetic judgment. The concept of freedom serves a central role in each of these rational capacities. Qua the spontaneity of thought, freedom constitutes the essence of the capacity for theoretical judgment. Qua autonomy, it serves as the main concept upon which Kant bases his theory of morality. Finally, it constitutes the basis of the capacity to make aesthetic judgments. Yet freedom is a concept of reason – a transcendental idea. It is not possible to know that it has objective reality by exhibiting it in sensible intuition.

            In this seminar, we will examine the variety of aspects of Kant's concept of reason and their inner relations. In the first part, we will address the roles of spontaneity in capacity for theoretical judgment. This part will include an examination of the third antinomy. In the second part, we will examine the realization of freedom qua "fact of reason" in Kant's moral theory. The third part addresses the role of the concept freedom in the account that Kant provides for moral judgment.