Meeting times: The course will meet as follows: One week of 6 hours of class alternating with one week of two hours practice with the teaching assistant.

Material: The course will cover single-person decision-making and multi-person interactive decision-making, i.e., game theory. In single-person decision making it will cover thoroughly the basic model of expected utility including the study of risk attitudes and the axiomatic characterization of the EU model, and it will also discuss the basic model of subjective expected utility. It will discuss criticisms of these models based on experimental evidence, and present some of the alternative models. In doing so we will touch upon what is often called behavioral economics. In the game-theory segment of the course we will explore strategic-form (simultaneous move) games and extensive-from (dynamic) games (including finitely repeated games and finite-horizon models of bargaining, and - time permitting - infinitely repeated games, infinite models of bargaining, and wars of attrition) and solution concepts used to solve and study such games (iterated (strong and weak) dominance, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium. We will study the theory and basic applications such as the Cournot and Bertrand models of pricing, Hotelling/Downs location games, strategic voting games, and more. Time permitting we will also study games with incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and auctions.

There will be some assigned readings from books and research papers, but the main source of material will be the class; participation in the class is absolutely necessary.

Grading: The course will be graded based on a final exam. There will be weekly problem sets; submitting 80% is required in order to take the exam.