Syllabus (tentative)

• Introduction: games, mechanism design, inefficiency of equilibrium and equilibrium computation
• Nash equilibrium and Nash’s theorem
• Zero-sum games: normal form and extensive form, minmax theorem, Yao’s principle
• Congestion games and potential games, pure NE existence and computation, best-response dynamics
• Inefficiency of equilibria: price of anarchy, price of stability, smoothness framework (extension to correlated equilibrium and regret minimization)
• Mechanism design basics: single-item auctions, Myerson’s lemma
• Algorithmic mechanism design: Multi-unit auctions: computation and communication
• VCG mechanisms
• Market models, equilibium, Welfare theorems, computational aspects

Course Requirements

• Class attendance is mandatory.
• Scribe notes (latex template, latex tutorial)
• Problem sets: 2-3 problem sets will be given during the semeter. You should submit them in pairs.
• Final exam.